- 問題
- 解説
- 第1段落
- What are we trying to understand when we try to understand consciousness?
- Not only do philosophers have no agreed-upon definition of consciousness, some think that it can’t be defined at all, that you can understand conscious experiences only by having them.
- Such philosophers see consciousness as Louis Armstrong purportedly saw jazz: if you need to ask what it is, you’re never going to know.
- Indeed, the task of explaining consciousness to someone who professes not to know — and there are philosophers who do profess this — is much more challenging than that of explaining jazz to the uninitiated.
- If you don’t know what jazz is, you can at least listen to music that is classified as jazz and compare it to its precursor ragtime, its cousin the blues, and its alter ego classical music.
- Presumably, such an exercise will give you a sense of jazz.
- But with consciousness, there is nothing to compare it to, since when you are not conscious, you are not aware of anything.
- Furthermore, jazz has been highly theorized since Armstrong’s time, so a trip through the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts may very well provide some insight into the nature of jazz for those who do not know.
- 第2段落
- Nevertheless, there are written accounts of consciousness intended to provide a sense of what consciousness is for those who claim not to know.
- Consciousness, it is said, is the state you are in when you are awake or dreaming and what you lack when you are in a dreamless sleep, under anaesthesia, or in a coma.
- Yet for those who claim not to know what the word ‘consciousness’ means, such an explanation will fall flat.
- Which aspect of being awake illustrates consciousness?
- Without knowledge of the relevant difference between being awake and being in a dreamless sleep, it would be difficult to know.
- After all, when I’m awake, my brain activity is different from when I’m in a dreamless sleep, but if I had wanted to convey that consciousness is merely a certain form of brain activity, I could have done that directly.
- Of course, you may have understood the proffered explanation of consciousness, but I imagine that you understood what consciousness was before you read it.
- 第3段落
- Some of the very same philosophers who think that nothing can be said to enlighten those who claim to not know what consciousness is have found quite a bit to say about what it is to those who claim to already know.
- And much of their discussion centres on the idea that for you to be conscious there has to be something it is like to be you:
- while rocks have no inner experiences — or so most presume — and thus there is nothing it is like to be a rock, you know that there is something it is like to be you, something it is like to savour your morning coffee, to feel the soft fur of a kitten, to feel the sting when that adorable kitten scratches you.
- These experiences are conscious experiences; they have what philosophers refer to as ‘qualitative content’ or ‘qualia’; there is something it is like to have these experiences.
- And that there is something it is like to have the wealth of experiences we have is, according to various philosophers, what makes life worth living.
- To be sure, whether the meaning of life resides in inner experience or in outward actions aimed at making the world a better place is worth pondering.
- But in any event, it does seem that without consciousness, something significant about our lives would be missing.
- 第4段落
- The claim that to be conscious is for there to be ‘something it is like to be you’ can be described in terms of having a ‘point of view’, or a ‘perspective’.
- To have a point of view in this sense is simply to be the centre of conscious experience.
- Of course, to explain consciousness in terms of having a point of view and then to explain what it is to have a point of view in terms of being conscious is circular.
- Yet, on the assumption that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of something else (you’re not going to understand it, unless you have it), such a circle is to be expected — whether it is a virtuous or a vicious one, however, can be debated.
- 第1段落
問題
次の文章を読み, 下線をほどこした部分(1)~(3)を和訳しなさい。
What are we trying to understand when we try to understand consciousness? Not only do philosophers have no agreed-upon definition of consciousness, some think that it can’t be defined at all, that you can understand conscious experiences only by having them. (1)Such philosophers see consciousness as Louis Armstrong purportedly saw jazz: if you need to ask what it is, you’re never going to know. Indeed, the task of explaining consciousness to someone who professes not to know — and there are philosophers who do profess this — is much more challenging than that of explaining jazz to the uninitiated. If you don’t know what jazz is, you can at least listen to music that is classified as jazz and compare it to its precursor ragtime, its cousin the blues, and its alter ego classical music. Presumably, such an exercise will give you a sense of jazz. But with consciousness, there is nothing to compare it to, since when you are not conscious, you are not aware of anything. Furthermore, jazz has been highly theorized since Armstrong’s time, so a trip through the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts may very well provide some insight into the nature of jazz for those who do not know.
Nevertheless, there are written accounts of consciousness intended to provide a sense of what consciousness is for those who claim not to know. Consciousness, it is said, is the state you are in when you are awake or dreaming and what you lack when you are in a dreamless sleep, under anaesthesia*, or in a coma. Yet for those who claim not to know what the word ‘consciousness’ means, such an explanation will fall flat. Which aspect of being awake illustrates consciousness? Without knowledge of the relevant difference between being awake and being in a dreamless sleep, it would be difficult to know. After all, when I’m awake, my brain activity is different from when I’m in a dreamless sleep, but if I had wanted to convey that consciousness is merely a certain form of brain activity, I could have done that directly. Of course, you may have understood the proffered explanation of consciousness, but I imagine that you understood what consciousness was before you read it.
(2)Some of the very same philosophers who think that nothing can be said to enlighten those who claim to not know what consciousness is have found quite a bit to say about what it is to those who claim to already know. And much of their discussion centres on the idea that for you to be conscious there has to be something it is like to be you: while rocks have no inner experiences — or so most presume — and thus there is nothing it is like to be a rock, you know that there is something it is like to be you, something it is like to savour your morning coffee, to feel the soft fur of a kitten, to feel the sting when that adorable kitten scratches you. These experiences are conscious experiences; they have what philosophers refer to as ‘qualitative content’ or ‘qualia’; there is something it is like to have these experiences. And that there is something it is like to have the wealth of experiences we have is, according to various philosophers, what makes life worth living. To be sure, whether the meaning of life resides in inner experience or in outward actions aimed at making the world a better place is worth pondering. But in any event, it does seem that without consciousness, something significant about our lives would be missing.
(3)The claim that to be conscious is for there to be ‘something it is like to be you’ can be described in terms of having a ‘point of view’, or a ‘perspective’. To have a point of view in this sense is simply to be the centre of conscious experience. Of course, to explain consciousness in terms of having a point of view and then to explain what it is to have a point of view in terms of being conscious is circular. Yet, on the assumption that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of something else (you’re not going to understand it, unless you have it), such a circle is to be expected — whether it is a virtuous or a vicious one, however, can be debated.
*anaesthesia 麻酔
解説
第1段落
What are we trying to understand when we try to understand consciousness?
What are weS trying to understandV when weS’ try to understandV’ consciousnessO’?
私たちS’が意識O’を理解しようとするV’ときに, 私たちSは何を理解しようとしているVのか?
意識について理解しようとしているとき, 本当は何について理解しようとしているのか?
Not only do philosophers have no agreed-upon definition of consciousness, some think that it can’t be defined at all, that you can understand conscious experiences only by having them.
Not only do philosophersS1 haveV1 no agreed-upon definitionO1 of consciousness, someS2 thinkV2 that itS’ can’t be definedV’ at all, that youS” can understandV” conscious experiencesO” only by having them.
哲学者S1が意識の無の同意された定義O1を持つV1だけでなく, いくつかS2はそれS’は全く定義されることができないV’ということ, つまり, あなたS”はそれらを持つことによってのみ意識的な経験O”を理解できるV”ということを考えるV2。
哲学者の間でさえ意識の定義が定まっていないだけでなく, そもそも定義することができず, 意識的な経験をすることによってのみ理解することができると考える人もいる。
Such philosophers see consciousness as Louis Armstrong purportedly saw jazz: if you need to ask what it is, you’re never going to know.
- このasは, 後ろに文の形があるので, 接続詞のas。see A as Bのasと間違えやすいので注意。
- purportedlyは文脈からの予測が難しいので訳せなくてもよい。副詞なので無視しても意味は通るはず。
Such philosophersS1 seeV1 consciousnessO1 as Louis ArmstrongS’ purportedly sawV’ jazzO’: if youS” need to askV” what it isO”, you’reS2 never going to knowV2.
そのような哲学者S1は, Louis ArmstorongS’がpurportedlyにジャズO’を見たV’ように, 意識O1を見るV1。もしあなたS”がそれが何かO”を尋ねる必要があるV”ならば, あなたS2は決して知るつもりではないV2。
そのような哲学者は, ルイ・アームストロングがジャズをみなしていたとされるのと同じような方法で, 意識をみなしている。つまり, それが何かと聞いている時点で, 決して理解できないだろう, ということである。
Indeed, the task of explaining consciousness to someone who professes not to know — and there are philosophers who do profess this — is much more challenging than that of explaining jazz to the uninitiated.
- professは難しめの単語だが, confessとの類似性から十分予測できる。
- uninitiatedは, initial「最初の」→initiate「始める」→uninitiate「始めない」→uninitiated「初心者の」のように派生語から類推できるが, 英文の対比構造をよく見れば, 知らなくても訳せる。
Indeed, the taskS of explaining consciousness to someone who professes not to knowV’ — and there areV” philosophersS” who do professV”’ thisO”’ — isV much more challengingC than that of explaining jazz to the uninitiated.
確かに, 知らないとprofessするV’ような誰かに対して意識を説明することのタスクSは, そしてこれO”’を実際にprofessするV”’ような哲学者S”は存在するV”, uninitiatedに対してジャズを説明することのあれよりもずっとよりチャレンジングCだ。
実際, 意識についてよく分からないという人々に意識について説明することは, ジャズについてよく分からないという人々にジャズについて説明することよりも, ずっと困難である。そして, 自分も意識についてよく理解していないと正直に述べている哲学者も, 実際に存在している。
If you don’t know what jazz is, you can at least listen to music that is classified as jazz and compare it to its precursor ragtime, its cousin the blues, and its alter ego classical music.
- classify A as B「AをBと分類する」
- compare A to[with] B「AをBと比較する」
- precursor ragtimeやalter egoなどは訳せなくてよいので, 何となく何を言っているかわかればOK。
If youS’ don’t knowV’ what jazz isO’, youS can at least listen toV musicO that is classifiedV” as jazz and compareV itO to its precursor ragtime, its cousin the blues, and its alter ego classical music.
もしあなたS’がジャズが何かということO’を知らないV’ならば, あなたSは少なくともジャズとして分類されているV”ような音楽Oを聴くことができVて, それOをそのprecursor ragtimeや, そのいとこのブルースや, そのalter egoのクラシック音楽と比較することができるV。
ジャズがどんなものか知らなくても, 少なくともジャズと分類されている音楽を聴くことができる。その前身であるラグタイム, いとこであるブルース, 分身であるクラシック音楽を聴いて比較することもできる。
Presumably, such an exercise will give you a sense of jazz.
Presumably, such an exerciseS will giveV youO1 a sense of jazzO2.
おそらく, そのようなエクササイズSはあなたO1にジャズのセンスO2を与えるだろうV。
おそらく, このようなことをすれば, ジャズの感覚がわかるだろう。
But with consciousness, there is nothing to compare it to, since when you are not conscious, you are not aware of anything.
But with consciousness, there isV nothingS to compare it to, since when youS” are not consciousV”, youS’ are not aware ofV’ anythingO’.
しかし意識とともに, それと比較すべき無SがあるV。なぜなら, あなたS”が意識していないV”ときに, あなたS’は任意のものO’を意識していないV’からだ。
しかし意識に関しては, 比較対象が存在しない。意識していない状態のときは, 何にも気づいていないからだ。
Furthermore, jazz has been highly theorized since Armstrong’s time, so a trip through the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts may very well provide some insight into the nature of jazz for those who do not know.
- may very wellもmay wellもmayと同じ。変な意味を覚える必要はない。
- 単数名詞(不可算名詞)の前についたsomeは, certainと同じで, 「ある, 特定の」。
- provide A with B = provide B for A「AにBを提供する」。
Furthermore, jazzS1 has been highly theorizedV1 since Armstrong’s time, so a tripS2 through the New York Public Library for the Performing Arts may very well provideV2 some insightO2 into the nature of jazz for those who do not knowV’.
さらに, ジャズS1はArmstrongの時間以来高くセオリー化されてきたV1ので, New York Public Library for the Performing Artsを通じた旅S2は, 知らないV’ような人々のためにジャズの性質の中へのある洞察O2を提供するかもしれないV2。
その上ジャズは, アームストロングの時代以降高度に理論化されてきたので, ニューヨークの図書館を少し回れば, ジャズを知らない人でもジャズの本質に関するいくらかの洞察は得ることができるかもしれない。
第2段落
Nevertheless, there are written accounts of consciousness intended to provide a sense of what consciousness is for those who claim not to know.
Nevertheless, there areV written accountsS of consciousness intended to providev a senseo of what consciousness is for those who claim not to knowV’.
それにもかかわらず, 知らないと主張するV’ような人々のために意識が何かということのセンスoを提供するvことを意図されたような意識の書かれた説明SがあるV。
しかしそれでも, 意識について分からないという人々に意識とは何かを分かってもらうための記述がある。
Consciousness, it is said, is the state you are in when you are awake or dreaming and what you lack when you are in a dreamless sleep, under anaesthesia, or in a coma.
- comaは知らなくてよい。
ConsciousnessS, it is said, isV the stateC youS’ areV’ in when youS” are awake or dreamingV” and what youS”’ lackV”’ when youS”” areV”” in a dreamless sleep, under anaesthesia, or in a coma.
意識Sは, ~だと言われている, あなたS”が起きたり夢見ているV”ときにあなたS’がinするような状態Cで, あなたS””が夢の無い睡眠の中, 麻酔の下, comaの中のときにあなたS”’が欠くV”’ものだ。
意識とは, 目覚めているときや夢を見ているときにある状態であり, 夢を見ていない睡眠中, 麻酔中, 昏睡状態にはない状態だと言われている。
Yet for those who claim not to know what the word ‘consciousness’ means, such an explanation will fall flat.
Yet for those who claim not to knowV’ what the word ‘consciousness’S” meansV”, such an explanationS will fallV flatC.
しかし, 「意識」という語S”が意味するV”ものを知らないと主張するV’ような人々にとって, そのような説明SはflatCに落ちるだろうV。
しかし, 「意識」という言葉の意味が分からないという人々にとっては, そのような説明も無意味だろう。
Which aspect of being awake illustrates consciousness?
Which aspect of being awake illustratesV consciousnessO?
起きていることのどの側面が, 意識Oを説明するVのか?
起きている状態のどの部分が, 意識を表しているのか。
Without knowledge of the relevant difference between being awake and being in a dreamless sleep, it would be difficult to know.
Without knowledge of the relevant difference between being awake and being in a dreamless sleep, itS would beV difficultC to know.
起きていることと夢の無い睡眠の中の間の関連する違いの知識なしに, 知ることSは難しいC だろうV。
起きている状態と, 夢を見ていない睡眠状態の違いが分からなければ, それを知るのは難しいだろう。
After all, when I’m awake, my brain activity is different from when I’m in a dreamless sleep, but if I had wanted to convey that consciousness is merely a certain form of brain activity, I could have done that directly.
After all, when I’m awake, my brain activityS1 isV1 differentC from when I’m in a dreamless sleep, but if IS” had wanted to conveyV” that consciousnessS”’ isV”’ merely a certain formC”’ of brain activity, IS2 could have doneV2 thatO2 directly.
結局, 私が起きているとき, 私の脳の活動S1は私が夢の無い睡眠の中にいるときから異なるC1。しかし, もし私S”が, 意識S”’は単に脳の活動のある形態C”’だということを伝えたかったV”なら, 私S2はあれO2をダイレクトに行っていただろうV2。
結局のところ, 起きている状態のときの脳の活動は, 夢を見ていない睡眠状態のときのものとは異なる。しかし, もし意識が脳の活動の一形態にすぎないということを伝えたかっただけであれば, それを直接伝えることができただろう。
Of course, you may have understood the proffered explanation of consciousness, but I imagine that you understood what consciousness was before you read it.
Of course, youS1 may have understoodV1 the proffered explanationO1 of consciousness, but IS2 imagineV2 that youS’ understoodV’ what consciousness wasO’ before youS” readV” itO”.
もちろん, あなたS1は意識のprofferされた説明O1を理解できたかもしれないV1。しかし, 私S2はあなたS”がそれO”’を読むV”’前に, あなたS”が意識とは何かO”を理解したとV”いうことを想像するV2。
もちろん, 意識についてそのように説明されたら理解したかもしれないが, それを読む前に意識とは何かすでに理解していたのだと思う。
第3段落
Some of the very same philosophers who think that nothing can be said to enlighten those who claim to not know what consciousness is have found quite a bit to say about what it is to those who claim to already know.
- enlightenはlightの動詞形で, 直訳の「照らす」から派生した「啓蒙する」の意味が重要。
- quite a bit = quite a few。
SomeS of the very same philosophers who thinkV’ that nothingS” can be saidV” to enlighten those who claim to not knowV”’ what consciousness isO”’ have foundV quite a bitO to say about what it is to those who claim to already knowV””.
意識とは何かということO”’を知らないと主張するV”’ような人々を明るくするために無のことS”が言えるV”ということを考えるV’ようなまさに同じ哲学者のいくつかSは, すでに知っていると主張するV””ような人々に対してそれが何かということについて言うためにかなりの量Oを見つけてきたV。
意識とは何かを知らないという人々に, 教えられることは何もないと考えるまさに同じ哲学者が, 意識をすでに知っているという人々には, かなり多くのこと語っている場合もある。
And much of their discussion centres on the idea that for you to be conscious there has to be something it is like to be you:
- centre = center「中心」で, ここでは動詞で使われているので, 「中心に集まる」。
- something it is like to be youの部分は難しいので適当に訳す。
And muchS of their discussion centresV on the idea that for you to be conscious there has to beV’ somethingS’ it is like to be you:
そして, この議論のほとんどSは, あなたが意識的であるために, あなたであることのような何かS’がある必要があるV’というアイデアの上にcentreするV。
そして, この議論の大部分は, 意識を持つためには, 自分が自分であるという感覚が必要であるという考えの上に成り立っていることが多い。
while rocks have no inner experiences — or so most presume — and thus there is nothing it is like to be a rock, you know that there is something it is like to be you, something it is like to savour your morning coffee, to feel the soft fur of a kitten, to feel the sting when that adorable kitten scratches you.
- savourとstingは知らなくてよいので, 全体的に何を言っているかわかればOK。
while rocksS’1 haveV’1 no inner experiencesO’1 — or so most presume — and thus there isV’2 nothingS’2 it is like to be a rock, youS knowV that there isV” somethingS” it is like to be you, something it is like to savour your morning coffee, to feel the soft fur of a kitten, to feel the sting when that adorable kittenS”’ scratchesV”’ youO”’.
石S’1は無の内部の経験O’1を持つV’1またはとてもほとんどが想定する, そしてしたがって石であることのような無S’2が存在するV’2一方, あなたSはあなたであるような何かS”, つまり, あなたの朝のコーヒーをsavourすること, 子猫のやわらかい毛皮を感じること, stingを感じることのような何かが存在するV”, あの愛らしい子猫S”’があなたO”’をひっかくV”’とき, ということを知るV。
石には内部意識が存在しない, またはたいていの場合そう思われているので, 石には自分が石であるという感覚がない。一方人間は, 自分が自分であるという感覚があることを知っている。それは, 朝のコーヒーを味わったり, 子猫のやわらかい毛を感じたり, そのかわいい子猫に引っかかれた時に痛みを感じたりするような感覚である。
These experiences are conscious experiences; they have what philosophers refer to as ‘qualitative content’ or ‘qualia’; there is something it is like to have these experiences.
- refer to A as B「AをBと呼ぶ, みなす」
These experiencesS1 areV1 conscious experiencesC1; theyS2 haveV2 what philosophersS’ refer toV’ as ‘qualitative content’ or ‘qualia’; there isV3 somethingS3 it is like to have these experiences.
これらの経験S1は意識的な経験C1だ。これらS2は哲学者S’が「質的な中身」または「qualia」と呼ぶV’ものを持つV2。これらの経験を持つことのような何かS3があるV3。
これらの経験は意識的なものであり, 哲学者が「質的内容」または「クオリア」と呼ぶものを備えている。つまり, これらの経験を持っているという「何かしらの感覚」がある。
And that there is something it is like to have the wealth of experiences we have is, according to various philosophers, what makes life worth living.
And that there isV’ somethingS’ it is like to have the wealth of experiences we have isV, according to various philosophers, what makesV” lifeO” worth livingC”.
そして, 私たちがもつ経験の豊かさを持つことのような何かS’があるV’ということは, 様々な哲学者によると, 人生O”を生きる価値のあるものC”にするV”ものだ。
そして, 豊かな経験を持っているという感覚があることによって, 人生は生きる価値のあるものになるのだと, 多くの哲学者が述べている。
To be sure, whether the meaning of life resides in inner experience or in outward actions aimed at making the world a better place is worth pondering.
To be sure, whether the meaning of lifeS’ resides inV’ inner experienceO’ or in outward actionsO’ aimed at makingmake the worldo a better placec isV worth ponderingC.
確かに, 人生の意味S’が, 内側の経験O’に住むV’のか, 世界oをより良い場所cにするmakeことへ狙われた外側の行動O’に住むのかということは, 熟考する価値があるC。
確かに, 人生の意味は内的経験にあるのか, それとも世界をより良くするための外的行動にあるのかを考えることは, 価値がある。
But in any event, it does seem that without consciousness, something significant about our lives would be missing.
- in any event「いずれにせよ」のイディオムは知らなくてよいが, 同じ意味のin any caseから類推してもよい。
But in any event, itS does seemV that without consciousness, something significantS’ about our lives would be missingV’.
しかし任意のイベントの中で, 意識無しに, 私たちの生活に関する重要な何かS’が欠けているであろうV’ということは実際に思われるV。
しかしどんな出来事においても, 意識がなければ, 人生で重要な何かが実際に欠けているように感じられる。
第4段落
The claim that to be conscious is for there to be ‘something it is like to be you’ can be described in terms of having a ‘point of view’, or a ‘perspective’.
The claimS that to be consciousS’ isV’ for there to be ‘something it is like to be you’C’ can be describedV in terms of having a ‘point of view’, or a ‘perspective’.
意識的であることS’は, 「あなたであることのような何か」が存在することC’であるという主張Sは, 「見方」や「観点」を持っているという観点から述べられることができるV。
意識的であるということは「自分が自分であるという感覚」が存在することであるという主張は, 「物事の見方」や「観点」を持っているという視点から, 述べることができる。
To have a point of view in this sense is simply to be the centre of conscious experience.
To have a point of viewS in this sense isV simply to be the centreC of conscious experience.
見方を持つことSは, この意味で, 単に意識的な経験の中心であることCだ。
この文脈では, 物事の見方を持っているというのは, 単に意識的な経験の中心にいるということである。
Of course, to explain consciousness in terms of having a point of view and then to explain what it is to have a point of view in terms of being conscious is circular.
Of course, to explain consciousnessS1 in terms of having a point of view and then to explain what it is to have a point of viewS2 in terms of being conscious isV circularC.
もちろん, 見方を持つことの観点から意識を説明することS1と, それから意識的であることの観点から見方を持つとは何かを説明することS2は, 円的Cだ。
もちろん, 物事の見方を持っているという視点から意識を説明し, そのあとで, 意識的であるという視点から物事の見方を持っているとはどういうことかを説明することは, 循環論法である。
Yet, on the assumption that we cannot explain consciousness in terms of something else (you’re not going to understand it, unless you have it), such a circle is to be expected — whether it is a virtuous or a vicious one, however, can be debated.
Yet, on the assumption that weS’ cannot explainV’ consciousnessO’ in terms of something else you’re not going to understand it, unless you have it, such a circleS1 is to be expectedV1 — whether itS” isV” a virtuous or a vicious oneC”, however, can be debatedV2.
しかし, 私たちS’は他の何かの観点から意識O’を説明できないV’という仮定の上で, あなたがそれをもたない限り, あなたはそれを理解しないだろう, そのような円S1は必ず予想されるV1。それS”が美徳または悪徳なそれC”かということは, しかし, 議論されることができるV2。
しかし, 他の視点からは意識を説明できないという前提の上では(意識がなければ意識を理解することは出来ないだろう), このような循環は予測されるものである。しかし, この循環が好循環か悪循環であるかは, 議論の余地がある。
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